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In this next instalment of the series examining the responses to the ‘status quo’ of the credit 
rating sector, the focus of this article will be on the ever-increasing option being offered by 
Scope Ratings, a European firm that is aiming to represent a viable alternative by way of 
merging most, if not all of the small and niche credit rating agencies that exist within the 
European Union. The agency is advertising itself as one that is concerned with increasing the 
qualitative research that is undertaken when developing a credit rating, whilst also basing its 
approach on the incorporation of ‘stress testing’ issuances, in order to ensure the highest 
levels of accuracy. However, the composition of the firm and its leaders alludes to a potential 
of a continuation of the business practices that are now, rightly, seen as part and parcel of 
the credit rating industry – this article will therefore examine the viability of Scope Ratings in 
terms of its potential for offering a real alternative to the hegemony of the Big Three. 
 
Introduction: ‘The Challenger’ 
 
Scope Ratings is a German-based firm that started life in 2002, with its initial mandate being 
to rate asset-based funds. Since then, the firm has grown to encompass the ability to rate 
corporate, structured finance, financial institutions’, and also sub-sovereign authorities’ 
ratings. The firm’s stated aim is to become a ‘European alternative to the “status quo” for 
institutional investors and issuers’1 and this article will assess the chances of Scope Ratings 
meeting this aim, as the underlying sentiment for any challenger to the hegemony of the ‘Big 
Three’ rating agencies – Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch Ratings – is that one must 
provide something different than what is offered by the Big Three. In order to assess the 
chances of Scope Ratings, it will be important to understand the mission of the firm in more 
detail, but also to examine whether what is being offered is actually different at all, and in 
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order to do that the focus will be upon the composition of the firm, together with the 
environment within which it hopes to grow. 
The modest firm, which began life in 2002 with the launch of its Asset Based Fund Rating 
division, was set up by Florian Schoeller, a member of the Schoeller business dynasty2. 
Although it was initially interested in providing Real Estate analysis, the business began to 
grow rapidly once it became accredited by the European Securities and Markets Authority in 
May of 20113, with the ability to offer ratings in the fields of Corporate Bonds, Structured 
Finance offerings, Financial Institutions and Sub-Sovereign Ratings following year after year. 
In order to increase its offerings, the firm has undertaken an aggressive Mergers & 
Acquisitions strategy – demonstrated by Scope’s CEO Torsten Hinrich’s announcement in 
2015 that ‘Acquisitions are indispensable to create a European champion’4 - which recently 
saw the firm acquire Feri EuroRating Services in January of 20175; the relatively rapid rate of 
growth now sees the firm service illustrious clients like BMW, Santander, and UBS6. The 
acquisition of Feri is significant, as it provides Scope with the ability to extend its services by 
adding additional prowess in the fields of sovereign credit ratings, investment fund analysis 
and real estate research7, which as will be discussed at the end of the article positions the firm 
nicely with respect to taking advantage of the ever-changing environment within Europe. 
However, the firm is making a conscious effort to develop its bank-rating abilities, and as 
such is currently developing a rating branch in London, under the control of former Moody’s 
head of European Bank Ratings Sam Theodore. The move is designed to make the firm 
centrally placed to commit to its ambitions to incorporate a new rating mentality, based upon 
increased qualitative research and a ‘regulator-style stress-testing of loan portfolios and 
capital strength’8, a move which Theodore envisions will set the agency apart from its 
competitors who all focus upon Bank defaults as their theoretical basis for research and who 
                                                 
2 Patrick Jenkins ‘Scope Ratings Aims to Shake-up Hegemony’ [2013] Financial Times (Apr. 15) 
https://www.ft.com/content/643daa98-a5eb-11e2-9b77-00144feabdc0. For more on the family see Peter Mathias 
and Michael M Postan The Cambridge Economic History of Europe (CUP 1978) 510. 
3 European Securities and Markets Authority CRA Authorisation (2017) 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/supervision/credit-rating-agencies/risk. 
4 Andreas Kröner and Andreas Framke ‘Credit Rating Agency Scope Eyes European Takeovers’ [2015] Reuters 
(Sep 30) http://uk.reuters.com/article/scope-mergers-idUKL5N12023M20150930. 
5 Feri EuroRating Services ESMA Registration was withdrawn as part of the acquisition, see ESMA Feri 
EuroRating Services AG CRA Registration Withdrawn Following Acquisition (2017) 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/feri-eurorating-services-ag-cra-registration-withdrawn-
following-acquisition. 
6 Kröner and Framke (n 4). 
7 Scope Ratings Scope Acquires FERI EuroRating (June 2016) 
https://www.scoperatings.com/research/details?id=152550&lC=EN. 
8 Jenkins (n 2). 
fulfil ‘investor demand for forward-looking rating opinions without strongly empirical 
pretensions’9. So, before we discuss the chances of the firm succeeding in its mission to offer 
a viable alternative to the dominance of the Big Three, it will be useful to understand that 




The ‘Big Three’, as a unit owing to their oligopolistic structure, can be viewed as the 
‘Champion’ with respects to Scope Rating’s status the ‘Challenger’ for a number of reasons. 
The first point to note is that the Big Three are not in the position that they are by chance; 
their dominance is a direct result of a number of factors which can be identified by reviewing 
their historical progression. Whilst it is beyond the scope or desire of this article to provide an 
in-depth analysis of each crucial stage of development, of which there are arguably six – the 
emergence of the commercialised agency in the 1840s10; the emergence of new competition 
in the late 1800s/early 1900s11; the incorporation into Depression-era regulations12; the near-
failure of rating agencies in the ‘Quiet Period’13; the re-inventing of the agencies’ role and 
purpose in the mid-1970s14; and then the centralised involvement of the agencies in the 
Financial Crisis of 2007/0815 - picking the story up from the 1970s onwards will be useful to 
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understand why Scope Ratings a. exists and b. why its aims are, in theory, extremely 
important. 
 
Up until the end of the 1960s in the United States, the continued existence of the credit rating 
agencies was considered doubtful; this may seem remarkable given that the Big Three are 
worth billions of dollars today, but the dynamic at that time meant that competition, aligned 
to the structural dynamics of the financial marketplace, was effectively killing the leading 
credit rating agencies. As you will have noticed, in the preceding sentence the word ‘rating’ 
has been emphasised and this is for good reason. If one takes a particular view of the 
literature, the problems faced by the leading agencies in the lead-up to the late 1960s were 
due to there just being no need for the agencies’ products, as the marketplace ‘trusted’16 in 
the perceived creditworthiness of leading financial institutions. However, this view is 
erroneous, because in reality the leading agencies’ products were being viciously undercut by 
their credit reporting brethren; Dun & Bradstreet (D&B)17. Dun & Bradstreet are, essentially, 
the amalgamation of two of the earliest commercialised credit agencies, but in declaring such 
we need to digress to understand the differing terminologies. Briefly, the first ‘rating’ agency 
belonged to John Moody and was established in the early 1900s18 – what had gone before 
were, technically, credit reporting firms, due to the actual nature of their products; credit 
reporting firms would assign a viewpoint, or an opinion, on an entity’s creditworthiness, 
whilst John Moody’s company (the ancestor of modern-day Moody’s) developed a 
systematic rating system which sees it, and its main competitors Standard Statistics19 and 
Poor’s Railroad Manual Company20, technically categorised as credit rating agencies. This 
division still exists today, but whilst the power balance is wholly in the favour of the rating 
agencies today, in the lead-up to the 1970s it was quite the opposite.  
 
                                                 
16 One scholar reviews the period by way of discussing the scenario whereby because no firms were defaulting, 
there was no need for the agencies’ products, see Rawi Abdelal Capital Rules: The Construction of Global 
Finance (Harvard University Press 2007) 167. 
17 For a review of the agencies’ competitor in this period – Dun & Bradstreet and their ‘National Credit Office’ -  
see Andrew Fight Understanding International Bank Risk (John Wiley & Sons 2004) 48. 
18 John Moody Moody’s Manual of Industrial and Miscellaneous Securities (The O.C. Lewis Company 1900). 
19 For a review of the progression of S&P see Richard S Wilson and Frank J Fabozzi Corporate Bonds: 
Structures & Analysis (Frank J Fabozzi Associates 1996) 211. 
20 ibid. 
When Arthur D. Whiteside joined Dun & Bradstreet in 193121, he brought his rating business 
with him – the National Credit Office (NCO) – and D&B thus developed both strands of 
‘rating’ business (both ‘reporting’ and then ‘rating’). The reason why all of this historical 
information is important is because, in 1970, a large rail-road conglomerate – Penn Central 
Railroad – defaulted on $82 million of commercial paper, which was a dominant investment 
vehicle in that period. Now, a number of onlookers suggest that this caused such a shock to 
the American financial system because investors had relied upon brand-recognition and 
sharply found that to be an inappropriate method of investing22, although in reality the 
investors had been using the products of a specialist rating organisation – The National 
Credit Office. The NCO, the SEC found after a large-scale investigation, had been issuing 
‘Prime’ rating after ‘Prime’ rating – the equivalent to the modern-day ‘AAA’ rating we are 
used to - almost irrespective of the underlying quality of Penn Central23; the similarities to the 
Financial Crisis of 2007/8 are almost laughable. So, the ‘rating’ agencies were suffering 
because their competitor was almost forcing them out of business24, but yet, as the investing 
public recoiled from the Penn Central crash, the commercial paper issuers were then faced 
with the desperate need to have their issuances validated by someone different than the NCO 
and here began the transformation of the withering rating agencies into the behemoths we are 
witness to today. The ‘how’ this took place is simple to articulate; the agencies played upon 
this new dynamic and started charging the issuers to have their issuances rated, rather than 
gather income via the subscriptions of investors i.e. the issuer-pays model that is the sole 
reason for the multi-billion dollar revenue streams today was born. 
 
Whilst a step-by-step analysis of this progression is best saved for another study, it is worth 
noting that researchers have proven, directly, that the rating agencies’ ratings began to 
systematically rise once the issuers starting paying for their ratings25. This is stated here as 
the connecting element between the development of this strategy in the 1970s and the 
explosion of the financial marketplace in 2007, which had the rating agencies peddling their 
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products to the highest bidder directly at the heart of the chaos26. The agencies’ growth on the 
back of this new income model can be charted almost exactly against the explosion in the 
issuance of structured finance products like Credit Default Swaps and the like i.e. this 
generation’s commercial paper boom. This incisive inclusion of the agencies into the very 
heart of the financial system, a system that is systematically addicted to credit27, had the 
obvious effect of bringing the agencies to the attention of the world’s leading regulatory 
authorities; owing to the nature of this article, it is worth focusing upon the European 
response, as the federalised bloc was to suffer in a unique way at the hands of the agencies. 
 
Since the Financial Crisis, the credit rating agencies have had a fraught relationship with the 
European Union. In response to the Crisis, the EU established three defined pieces of 
legislation28 which sought to constrain and regulate the activities of rating agencies 
performing rating services within its jurisdiction. Yet, the effects of the rating agencies’ 
differing approaches would lead to a much more systemic issue with the Sovereign Debt 
Crisis, which saw countries like Ireland, Spain, and Greece suffer greatly because of the poor 
ratings that they attracted from the leading rating agencies. Quaglia discusses how the 
‘sovereign debt crisis renewed the political interest in the regulation of credit rating agencies 
in the E.U. [because] during the crisis, credit rating agencies downgraded to junk bonds the 
ratings of sovereign debts in the periphery of Europe, worsening the crisis and attracting 
blame from some politicians as well as regulators’29. This ‘worsening’ that Quaglia describes 
is a symptom that has long been the focus of scholars concerned with the output of the 
agencies, with some describing their output as ‘procyclical, unreliable’30, and as having a low 
‘informational value’31. This has been understood as being demonstrative of the systemic 
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effect that a lowering of rating can have upon an entity32, and in fact has been proven by the 
agencies’ involvement in the East Asian Crisis in the late 1990s33. 
 
In response to this systemic effect, the E.U. has endeavoured to promote competition in the 
sector as much as possible. Although this issue of artificially promoting competition within a 
sector that is commonly recognised as constituting a ‘natural oligopoly’34, meaning that 
competition cannot be artificially promoted and in fact will result in negative consequences 
across the board35, is regarded to be a negative (usually resulting in a lower quality output 
from the established members36), the E.U. is insistent upon stimulating ‘competition in the 
credit rating industry by encouraging issuers and related third parties to appoint a variety of 
credit rating agencies to rate their entities and financial instruments’37. According to the 
ESMA’s official report, Standard & Poor’s holds 45% of the market, Moody’s 31% and Fitch 
16%, with Scope Ratings holding just 0.39%. Yet, the E.U. is moving forward with the idea 
that where issuers intend to use two or more CRAs, they should consider appointing one 
CRA with less than a 10% market share38, which is clearly the market that Scope Ratings 
hopes to capitalise on.  
 
Can Scope Ratings Succeed?: ‘The Tale of the Tape’ 
 
So, with this in mind, it will now be useful to examine the reasons why Scope will be best 
placed to take advantage of this push by the E.U. to artificially promote competition, but also 
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why the firm may fall to the same fate that has besieged most, if not all other newcomers to 
this hostile marketplace. However, before we do so it is worth looking at some of the 
common dynamics that can be witnessed whenever a challenger emerges in this particularly 
inhospitable field. There are arguably three forms of challenge to the hegemony of the Big 
Three, and they are a non-profit alternative; a subscriber-pays alternative; or a collection of 
smaller agencies gathering together to protect themselves from the advances of the Big Three, 
who have ruthless M&A strategies to guard against their usurping. These differing 
approaches to challenging the Big Three have garnered very different forms of success, with 
the most successful so far being to group together and pool resources/experience/reputation to 
make one’s own way in the marketplace that is essentially captured by a number of 
intertwined dynamics like historical regulatory support, investment strategies, and investment 
intricacies. Before we analyse how Scope Ratings may fare, assessing how each of these 
forms have developed will be useful. 
 
In terms of non-profit approaches, the two key exemplars of this approach are the 
Bertelsmann Foundation’s ‘International Non-Profit Credit Rating Agency’ (INCRA) project 
which aims to develop a qualitative-based approach to rating sovereign bonds with a much 
longer and socially-concerned lens then exists now39, and the National University of 
Singapore’s ‘Credit Rating Initiative’ project, that aims to develop an organic database of 
firms that have systematically-developed ratings attached to them40. These two initiatives are 
incredibly fascinating and worthy of support, but they have not yet garnered that support, 
with both seeking funding which is, unfortunately, not forthcoming owing to the parameters 
of the field. The second approach to challenging the Big Three is to develop a subscriber-
pays approach and market the agency upon that basis. The forerunner of that approach is the 
American firm Egan-Jones Rating, a firm that was established in 1995 and puts its 
subscriber-pays income method at the forefront of its marketing campaign. However, this 
approach was challenged by the hostile environment that is the credit rating arena, and the 
SEC no less sought (and eventually succeeded) in barring the firm from becoming ‘nationally 
recognised’ on the basis that it must ‘disseminate publically’ its ratings – something which it 
obviously cannot do if it exists on capturing income from subscribers who have to pay for 
exposure; Macey is clear in his condemnation of the SEC when he states that the SEC 
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demonstrated its ‘pure maliciousness’41 towards any competitor of the Big Three in this 
course of events. So, this is the environment that Scope Ratings is attempting to develop itself 
within, and for that reason Egan-Jones moved to the third form of challenging; grouping 
together. Arguably the most successful approach to date, but mostly in that it has not yet 
completely been dismissed, can be seen in the development of the Universal Credit Rating 
Group (UCRG), which is the partnership formed by Egan-Jones, Dagong, and RusRatings42. 
The UCRG is developing upon the need to both develop an alternative based upon shared 
experience and reputation, but also upon the need to develop a ratings initiative which is 
sensitive to both issuers and investors in places other than the West (it is for this reason that 
the BRICS nations are actively seeking to develop a BRICS-based agency43). Whilst the 
Group is still developing and garnering its support, is it at least developing at a rate worthy of 
mentioning, and for that reason alone we can say that developing a shared-endeavour is 
probably the most appropriate and potentially-successful method of challenging the 
hegemony of the Big Three. On that basis, we can return to Scope who are, by way of an 
M&A strategy being developed across the European continent, creating their own unique 
version of the ‘safety in numbers’ method. 
 
However, to be realistic, we shall begin with the reasons why Scope Ratings may not succeed 
in its mission to offer a viable alternative, with the obvious point to be made is that Scope’s 
market capitalisation is incredibly low in comparison to the Big Three. 0.39% is so low, that 
it is difficult to imagine how the firm may grow enough to become a viable player in the 
marketplace, irrespective of the aims of the E.U. to artificially produce competition. Also, the 
risk of growth, if the firm was fortunate enough to experience any significant growth, is that 
it would bring the firm within the eye-line of the Big Three, which usually results in the firm 
being incorporated into one of the Big Three, which is how the oligopoly is maintained. The 
counterbalance to this is to form alliances amongst other small agencies, like that seen with 
the forming of the Universal Credit Rating Group, but whether Scope Ratings would be 
willing to do this and whether it falls into their operating mission cannot be known. The other 
impediment is the fear regarding its composition. Its head of its nascent and organisationally 
important Bank rating division, Sam Theodore, has extensive links to Moody’s which, as we 
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now know, has admitted to having a specific culture which is based upon defrauding 
investors and transgressing in the name of profit44 - the presence of someone who was 
moulded in that culture, arguably, raises concerns as to the culture that would be present if 
Scope Ratings were to grow to any significant size. One final technical issue would be that if, 
and it is a big ‘if’, Scope were to grow to have over 10% of the market share, then it would 
no longer satisfy the E.U.’s designation for the enforced competition rule, which would create 
its own problems for Scope. 
 
However, as with all endeavours that are aiming to challenge the hegemony of the Big Three, 
it is important not to be too negative. Whilst there are a number of concerns and impediments 
to the agency becoming a viable alternative, there are a number of aspects which may go in 
the favour of the firm. The first, and perhaps most important, is the E.U.’s insistence on 
challenging the hegemony itself. The creation of an enforced procedure whereby issuers 
would have to consult a smaller agency is already paying dividends for Scope, which for a 
small firm to have clients such as BMW and UBS is mightily impressive at this nascent stage 
of its development. Also, the changing landscape within the E.U., as the U.K. begins its 
secession from the Union and many constituent parts of the Union vote in what could be 
defining moments for the E.U., mean that there should be an increasing emphasis upon 
promoting internal business, a sentiment which should see firms like Scope, who are 
embarking upon becoming the premier European-sourced rating agency, be promoted and 
supported by the E.U. more than ever before. Lastly, the composition of the agency, based 
upon the amalgamation of specialist firms that have an intimate knowledge of Europe’s 
business and culture, should see Scope represent the very essence of the E.U., which should 
distinguish it from its American competitors and represent a viable alternative to business 
looking to do business within a European Union that may become protectionist in outlook 
once the U.K. secedes – protectionism, as the U.S. and the U.K. have demonstrated, is 
apparently the order of the day, so it may be the case that the E.U. seeks to encourage the 
prosperity of its own first, before supporting the business of ‘outsider’ firms who have their 
base in non-E.U. countries. At the time of writing, the development of the firm reads like the 
typical trajectory of a new entrant into this specific market place, with positive elements 
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including the establishment of an ancillary service division45 – positive in terms of extra 
revenue streams for the company – although the negative describes a common factor; the Big 
Three have an extremely large legal capability based upon resources and experience, whilst 
new entrants do not, and the news earlier this year that Scope is being sued for inaccurate 
ratings in Germany46 provides a dose of realism for the company – that the Big Three are 




Ultimately, in this article, we were introduced to a firm that is endeavouring to provide an 
alternative to the Big Three by utilising a tactic that allowed the Big Three to dominate the 
market place. By acquiring smaller competitors, Scope Ratings now has an array of 
capabilities that are all underpinned by an intimate knowledge of European business. 
However, the official reports show that there is still an awfully long way to go before this 
firm can be considered an alternative. There are question marks over the composition of the 
agency, specifically in reference to the careers of some of the leading figures within the 
organisationally important sectors of the firm, but the changing landscape within Europe, 
when coupled to the sentiment of enforced competition, mean that there is a potential for the 
firm to at least grow its market share. There have been a number of analyses into the potential 
of entities to challenge the hegemony of the Big Three, many of which have concluded that 
there is little chance of change any time soon. Unfortunately, Scope Ratings arguably falls 
into this category, but what is encouraging is both the endeavour to supply an alternative, 
which must be the first step, but also the institutional encouragement to do so being offered 
by the E.U. – that fact alone should inspire other alternatives to be introduced and supported, 
as it is vitally important that the hegemony of the Big Three agencies is challenged for the 
good of society; we are now living the consequences of when it is allowed to prevail. 
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